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). Tournaments are distinguished from other incentive devices, for instance, piece rates, by the fact that an agent's payment in a tournament depends only on his performance relative to that of other agents covered by the incentive system. In the simplest possible case, the rank-order tournament, the agent's payoff depends only on the rank of his performance relative to that of other agents in the system. This literature is empirically relevant given the pervasiveness of tournaments. For example, salespeople are often paid a bonus that depends on their sales relative to those of the other salespeople in the firm. Most managers are involved in promotion tournaments, for example, six vicepresidents competing to be promoted to president, as are assistant professors who compete for a limited number of tenured positions. Finally, election to political office may also be considered a type of tournament.
Given that a theory has been devised for these incentive systems, the next step is, of course, to test the propositions generated by the theory. This, however, is very difficult using natural data because many of the predictions hinge on properties of utility functions and the values of the rewards used. Data on these parameters are seldom available. Indeed, the only readily testable proposition to be generated by the theory concerns the distribution of prizes in sport matchplay tournaments. (See Rosen [1984] ; see also Antle and Smith [1984] for an attempt to test the theory of tournaments outside this setting.) In view of the enormous problems with testing the theory of tournaments using natural data, one is compelled to test the theory in an experimental setting. This paper provides the first experimental evidence on the major predictions of theory.
It is worthwhile noting that this paper does not attempt to answer the question under what conditions tournament incentive systems might dominate other forms of incentive systems. Green and Stokey (1983) , among others, have studied this issue from a risk-shifting point of view. Bhattacharya (1985) and Bhattacharya and Guasch (1985) have addressed this problem from a strategic point of view. In particular, Bhattacharya has shown that the possibility of collusion on the part of the workers together with moral hazard on the part of the principal may result in tournaments' being dominated by termination-based incentive schemes. We ask a logically prior question, namely, do laboratory subjects exhibit the effort levels predicted by simple rank-order tournaments? If they do not, then the optimality issue is moot until a predictively accurate theory of tournaments is formulated.
Our findings are described later in the paper. In summary, we find that the theory explains behavior in tournaments reasonably well in the sense of predicting average behavior across identical tournaments, though it does rather poorly in predicting behavior in any single specific tournament; that is, there is a large variance of behavior across identical tournaments. Moreover, this variance of behavior is much larger than that observed in a piece rate system. The piece rate system performed extremely well. We attribute this variance to the fact that a tournament, unlike the piece rate, is a game and so requires strategic, as opposed to simply maximizing, behavior. These conjectures are supported by our data. Furthermore, disadvantaged (high-cost) agents in uneven tournaments provide more effort than predicted by the theory. Rather than discouraging them, asymmetries in tournaments seem to elicit high effort levels from disadvantaged contestants. Finally, giving contestants additional, but not complete, information about the action of their opponents also appears to increase effort levels or slow the rate at which agents converge on their optimal choices. Whether these results are generic can be discovered only by further replication of our experiments. The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes briefly the major results of the positive theory of tournaments and in some detail the precise propositions examined experimentally. Section III gives the experimental design, and Section IV describes the results. These are then analyzed in Section V. Section VI contains some conclusions and suggestions for further research.
II. The Theory of Tournaments
In tournaments, an agent's payment is a function of relative performance; thus tournaments place agents in a noncooperative game. The theory of tournaments predicts the equilibrium to this game. This is demonstrated by the rank-order tournament in which an agent's payment depends only on the rank of his or her performance and not on either the absolute level of performance or the size of the differences in performance across agents. Because of its simplicity we will restrict ourselves to such rank-order tournaments.
Consider the following two-person, symmetric tournament. Two identical agents i andj have the following utility function that is separable in the payment received and the effort exerted: 
The equations above specify a game with payoffs given by (1) and a strategy set E given by the set of all feasible choices of effort. The theory of tournaments restricts itself to pure strategy Nash equilibria to this game. Notice that if the distribution of (E, -Ej) is degenerate either because there are no random shocks to output or because such shocks are perfectly correlated across agents, then the game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.3
With suitable restrictions on the distribution of the random shocks and the utility functions, a unique, pure strategy Nash equilibrium will exist for the game. This is the behavioral outcome predicted by the theory of tournaments. Testing the theory requires the specification of the utility function, the production function, the distribution of (E--Ej), and the prizes M and m. One simple specification is the following. For k = i, j, 2 Some rule is required to deal with cases in which Yi = yj. For simplicity of exposition we ignore this possibility.
3 To see this consider the case in which the random shocks to output are identically zero. At any pair ej = ej, i can raise his expected utility by raising his effort slightly and so winning the tournament for sure. Thus no symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. No asymmetric pure strategy Nash exists either. If such an equilibrium were to exist with ej > ej, then ej would have to be zero and e infinitesimally higher, but then j would have an incentive to raise ej, thereby contradicting the existence of the equilibrium. 
Equations (6) and (7) give testable relationships between the prize spread, c, and a on the one hand and the level of effort chosen on the other hand. Several testable hypotheses about economic tournaments are suggested by the description above. The fundamental hypothesis generated by the theory is that, whenever agents are placed in a tournament described by (1') and (2'), they will choose effort levels consistent with the Nash equilibrium of the associated game as described by (5). This is the first hypothesis tested.
HYPOTHESIS
1A. Equilibrium Hypothesis: Strong Form. Effort levels associated with the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game defined by the tournament, and effort levels chosen in the tournament, will not differ significantly.
Hypothesis 1A is very strong, requiring observance of Nash equilibrium behavior in every tournament, in either the real world or the laboratory. A weaker version of this hypothesis requires only that we observe such behavior on average over identical tournaments. This is summarized in hypothesis lB. HYPOTHESIS 1 B. Equilibrium Hypothesis: Weak Form. The average effort levels chosen by agents engaged in a set of identical tournaments will not differ significantly from the Nash equilibrium of the game defined by the tournament.
If we denote the predicted effort in a tournament by Xe, the mean observed effort by x0, and the variance of observed efforts across identical tournaments by (u2, then hypothesis IA allows x0 = xe and u2 = 0 while hypothesis lB allows u2 = 0. In this sense hypothesis IA is stronger than lB.
Another hypothesis that can be drawn from (5) concerns the impact of changing the distribution of the random shocks and the prize spread. Specifically, (5) tells us the exact proportionate changes in the prize spread (M -m) that must be carried out in response to a change in cla in order to keep e* constant. This gives us hypothesis 2. HYPOTHESIS 2. Invariance Hypothesis. Changes in (M -m) and c/a that are consistent with a fixed value of e* in (5) will leave unaltered the average level of effort chosen across a set of identical tournaments.
Note that hypothesis 2 is independent of hypotheses IA and lB. While these hypotheses predict the equilibrium level of effort, hypothesis 2 predicts the combinations of parameters that will leave observed effort levels constant. Hence, hypothesis 2 tests, in effect, 7 whether agents in a tournament are subject to any illusions concerning changes in either the prize spread or the randomness they face. For instance, a large increase in randomness may lead them to believe that whether they win or not has become so dependent on the realization of E that it is not worth their while to exert any effort. If, however, the prize spread has also been raised in a way consistent with (5), the agents' conclusion is incorrect.
A similar illusion problem can occur in an uneven tournament. An agent knowing that he or she is disadvantaged may become discouraged and drop out of the tournament by supplying zero effort. Alternatively, the lack of symmetry in the tournament may lead the disadvantaged agent to drop out in disgust. Because economic tournaments are so common and almost always involve dissimilar agents, it is of great social and economic concern whether agents do react in these ways rather than those described by the theory and formalized in (6) and (7). This leads to our third hypothesis. HYPOTHESIS 3. Disadvantaged Contestant Hypothesis. In uneven tournaments of the type described above, the average effort levels of the disadvantaged agents do not differ from those predicted by equation (7).
Our final hypothesis dealing exclusively with tournaments concerns the impact of changing the amount of information given to agents on tournament outcomes. In the literature, it is assumed that agents are simply informed of their rank. However, in many real-world situations agents find out not only their rank but also by how much they won or lost, for example, sales tournaments. In the one-shot tournaments described above, such differences in information should have no impact on behavior. This can be tested. Since most economic tournaments are repeated rather than one-shot tournaments and because information plays a crucial role in determining the equilibria to repeated games, this test has importance that goes beyond simply testing the available theory. HYPOTHESIS 4. Information Hypothesis. When agents in a symmetric tournament are told both their rank and their realized outputs, their effort levels will on average not deviate significantly from those occurring in an identical tournament in which output information is withheld.
Real-world organizations must decide which type of incentive system to use, and so the performance of tournaments relative to other incentive systems is as important as their absolute performance. While it was infeasible to compare experimentally the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments with all other incentive systems, we did compare tournaments with what is perhaps the archetypal incentive system, the piece rate. We test whether a tournament and a piece rate system that are designed to implement the same level of effort yield identical effort choices. HYPOTHESIS 5. Piece Rate Equivalence. The average effort levels chosen across a set of identical, symmetric economic tournaments will not differ significantly from the average effort levels chosen in an equivalent piece rate system. While a tournament defines a game for workers to play, a piece rate asks them only to solve a maximization problem. Since maximization problems, however complex, are free of the conjectural problems found even in the simplest games, we expect a smaller variance of behavior under a piece rate system than under a tournament. We define the variance of behavior in a tournament as the variance across identical tournaments of the average within-tournament effort provided by the agents. In particular, we might expect the variance in behavior across tournaments to be greater than the variance of effort choices across agents for an identical piece rate system. Such a difference is clearly important for an organization's decision about which type of incentive system to install: Although both theories predict a zero variance of choices, we test the following hypothesis. HYPOTHESIS 6. Variance Hypothesis. The variance of effort levels chosen across a set of identical, symmetric economic tournaments is greater than the variance of effort levels chosen by agents facing an equivalent piece rate system.
III. Experimental Design

A. The Experiment
We tested the theory of tournaments with 10 separate experiments. The first four hypotheses stated in Section II were tested by running seven experiments; each experiment used different subjects and parameters. The eighth experiment tested a simple piece rate system while the ninth and tenth experiments involved subjects playing against automata.
A typical experiment was conducted as follows. We recruited a group of students, usually 24 in number, from economics courses at New York University. They reported to a room that had chairs placed around its perimeter, each chair facing the wall. The students were randomly assigned seats and subject numbers and given written instructions. (See the Appendix for a sample of the instructions.)
We informed subjects that another subject was randomly assigned as their "pair member" and that the amount of money they would earn in the experiment was a function of their decisions, their pair member's decisions, and the realizations of a random variable. The physical identity of the pair member was not revealed. The experiment then began. We asked each subject to choose an integer between zero and 100 (inclusive). This was called their "decision number," and each subject entered his or her choice on the work sheet. Corresponding to each decision number was a cost listed in a table in the instructions. With one exception, in all the experiments these costs took the form of e21c, C > 0, where e represents the decision number and c was a scaling factor used to make sure payoffs were of a reasonable size. After subjects recorded their decision numbers, an experimental administrator circulated with a box containing bingo balls labeled with the integers, including zero, from -a to + a. These were called "random numbers." Each subject would pull a random number from the box, replace it, enter it on his or her work sheet, and then add it to the decision number to yield the "total number" for that round. This information was recorded on a slip of paper, which was then collected from the subject. An administrator compared the total numbers for each pair of subjects. We then announced which pair member had the highest total number in each pair.6 The pair members with the highest and lowest total numbers were awarded, respectively, "fixed payments" M and m, M > m. Each subject then calculated his or her payoff for the round by subtracting the cost of his or her decision number from the fixed payment. All the tournament's parameters, except the identity of each subject's pair member, were common knowledge.
When this round was completed and the payoffs were recorded, the next round began. All the rounds were identical. Each group of subjects repeated this procedure for 12 rounds. When the last round was completed, the subjects calculated their payoff for the entire experiment by adding up their payoffs for the 12 rounds and subtracting $2.00. The experiments lasted approximately 75 minutes, and subjects earned between $5.00 and $13.00.7 These incentives seemed to be more than adequate.8
The experiment replicated the simple example of a tournament given in the previous section. The decision number corresponds to 6 In one experiment the size of the difference between the total numbers of the pair members was also announced while in another experiment the decision numbers were also announced. If both members of a pair had the same total number, then a coin was tossed to decide which pair member was to be designated as having the highest total number. The subjects were informed of this tie-breaking procedure before the experiment began.
7 One experiment was run for 25 rounds, and in this one $10 was subtracted from the sum of the payoffs for each round. This experiment lasted for almost 2 hours. 8 To check that these incentives were adequate, experiment 1 was also run with payoffs quadrupled so that subjects could, and did, win over $40. The results of this experiment did not differ substantially from that described in the text. effort, the random number to the random shock to productivity, the total number to output, and the decision cost to the disutility of effort.
Several points need to be made about our experimental procedures. First, we tried not to use value-laden terms in the instructions. For instance, instead of calling subjects with the high total numbers "winners," we simply called them "high-number people." Similarly, M and m were never called "prizes" but simply "fixed payments." We did this to remove any possible emphasis on the game nature of the experiment and to reduce the possibility that winning might affect subjects' decisions independently of their payoffs. Second, subjects performed the experiment once and with only one set of parameters so that no carryover effects from previous experiments or sets of parameters could occur. Third, in recruiting subjects we took steps to minimize subject contamination. Six of the 10 experiments were run within three 2-day sessions so that the experiments were completed quickly, thereby reducing the possibility of experienced subjects talking to new subjects. We also recruited from each class only once to try to minimize experienced/new subject communication.
The experimental tournaments were repeated 12 times, although the theory of tournaments deals with one-shot rather than repeated tournaments. We did this because we asked the subjects to make complex decisions. So the first few decisions might well have been error ridden simply because the subjects had not fully understood the problem that they faced. Such repetition is common experimental practice. It does introduce dynamic elements into a test of a static theory. However, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the 12-round repeated game involves the choice of the Nash equilibrium effort levels to the one-shot game in each round. Thus the theory's predictions for the experimental game are independent of finite repetition.9 Hence, for many of the comparisons made the data from the twelfth round are used.'0 B. Choosing Parameters Experimental parameter choice was restricted by equation (5). The equation shows that if one wishes to keep predicted effort levels constant, any change in (M -m), a, or c must be compensated for by an 9 We conducted one experiment that was identical to experiment 1 with the exception that pair members were randomly reassigned after each round and this was common knowledge. The results of this experiment were not significantly different from those reported here in which there was no rotation of pair members.
10 In experiments there is always the possibility of terminal effects, i.e, discontinuities in behavior between the penultimate and last rounds. There was no evidence of this in these experiments. appropriate change in at least one of the other parameters. In addition, we chose parameters so that subjects could not lose money, and, in going from experiment to experiment, we tried to keep payoffs relatively constant. These multiple constraints meant that in two cases (experiments 2 and 3) we were forced to change two or three parameters from experiment to experiment. Experiments 1 and 5-9 involved only ceteris paribus changes. Table 1 describes the parameter values used in the experiments. Experiment 1 is the baseline experiment in that it furnishes the first test of the predictions of the theory of tournaments as summarized by hypotheses 1A and 1B. The prizes were $1.45 and $0.86, the range of the random numbers was -40 to + 40, and the cost of effort (decision number) function was $e2/10,000. Because we ran a similar experiment with random numbers ranging between -80 and +80, we called experiment 1 the narrow random number range experiment. Given these parameter values, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the tournament can be found from equation (5) to be 37. We chose parameters to yield a Nash equilibrium of 37 because that number did not seem to be any kind of natural focal point in the way that, for instance, 50 might be. Thus if 37 is observed as an outcome, it would provide striking support for the theory.
To check the robustness of the results of experiment 1, we ran a second experiment in which the parameter values (see table 1) were chosen so as to give a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 74. Thus this second experiment gives us an independent test of hypotheses IA and lB. Experiment 3, while furnishing still another test of hypotheses IA and iB, also tests hypothesis 2, the invariance hypothesis. Relative to experiment 1, the prize spread was left constant at $0.59 but the range of the random numbers was doubled to -80 to +80 (hence this is called the wide random number range experiment) while the cost of effort was halved to $e2/20,000. Given the same prize spread, this halving of the marginal cost and doubling of the random number range will, according to (5), leave the pure strategy Nash equilibrium effort level unaltered at 37. Contrary to the theory, since the range of the random element in output has become so wide, we might expect subjects to reduce their efforts because payoffs are extremely dependent on chance. A comparison between the outcomes of experiments L and 3 enables us to test hypothesis 2.
The fourth experiment tested the disadvantaged contestant hypothesis, hypothesis 3. This experiment had prizes of $1.60 and $0.80 " One also has to check that the agents do not find it optimal to go to a corner solution and so violate eq. (5). and a range of -40 to +40 for the random numbers. While one member of each pair had a cost of effort of $e2/25,000, the other member was disadvantaged by having a cost of effort exactly double this. This fact was common knowledge. From equations (6) and (7) we can see that the theory predicts that the low-cost member of each pair will choose 70 while the disadvantaged member will choose 35. Experiment 5 tests the information hypothesis, hypothesis 4. The experiment was identical to experiment 1 except that in each round, after the total numbers had been collected from the subjects, the subjects were told not only which of them had the highest total numbers but also by how much their total number exceeded that of their pair member. Each subject could calculate his or her corresponding pair member's total number in each round. A comparison of the results of experiments 1 and 5 thus gives a test of the information hypothesis.
Experiments 6-9 were run after we observed that, while the means behaved roughly as expected, the variance of effort across tournaments was large throughout the full 12 rounds of the experiments. The large variances led us to ask if there was some aspect of the experiments that could be changed to reduce them. Three explanations for the large variances present themselves. The most obvious one is that noise created by the random number draws was preventing the subjects from inferring accurately the behavior of their opponent. The second explanation is that the conjectural aspect of the decision problem generated a wide variety of behavior. Thus even if players had full information about their opponent's previous choices, they could not predict future plays accurately. Finally, it may be that in the tournaments, even if the opponent's current and future choices were known, the maximization involved might be very difficult and so result in a lot of errors.
We thought that if the variance in behavior was caused by the subjects' lack of information about the decision number choices of their pair member, then providing subjects with this information at the end of each round should reduce this variance. This is what we did in experiment 6, which otherwise replicated experiment 1. In this experiment subjects were completely informed about all past plays by their opponent, and so, if a large variance in behavior is observed across these experimental tournaments, we can conclude that the variance in behavior observed in tournaments is not due simply to the presence of the random variable.'2
To test the role of conjectural variations, or equivalently the game nature of tournaments, in generating the variance of outcomes, sub-jects were made to play against an automaton that always chose 37. Experiment 7 used the same parameters as experiment 1, but in addition subjects were told that they were playing against an automaton that would always choose the same decision number but not what that number would be. In fact the automaton always chose 37. Thus in this experiment, although the subjects did not have to worry about conjectural variations, they did not know their opponent's precise strategy. A comparison of the results of experiments 6 and 7 will give us a measure of the role of conjectural variations in generating variance across tournaments.
In experiment 8 the subjects were told not only that they were playing against an automaton but also that the automaton would choose 37. Since this change eliminated all conjectural and informational problems, subjects were faced with a maximization problem rather than a game. Any variance in choices across subjects in experiment 8 solely represents errors in maximization or computation difficulties. Any variance in experiment 7, on the other hand, also reflects subjects' learning processes but not their conjectural variations. Thus a comparison of the results of experiment 8 with those of the piece rate experiment, experiment 10, will show how much of the variance of choices across identical tournaments can be explained purely by the computational difficulty of the tournament when compared with the piece rate.
While experiment 6 tested the possibility that a lack of information about the opponent's choices caused the observed variance of behavior, as a practical guide to the design of tournaments this experiment was of little use because it required the principal to disseminate information that, by assumption, he or she could not have. With this in mind we investigated an alternative way of increasing the accuracy of inferences about the behavior of the opponent, namely increasing the number of repetitions. As the period between payoffs in repeated tournaments is in the control of the principal, this potentially provides the principal with a way of reducing the variance of behavior if that variance is due to such inference problems. In experiment 9 we repeated experiment 1 but extended it to 25 rounds.
The final experiment, experiment 10, dealt with a piece rate. In order to test hypotheses 5 and 6 we constructed an equivalent piece rate system. In this experiment 13 subjects entered a room and were given written instructions. In each of 12 identical rounds they were asked to choose an integer between 0 and 100, having first considered a table giving the costs of choosing each decision number. This cost function was $e2/2,000, and the output function was 0.2 + 0.037e + E. The subjects recorded their decision number and then drew a bingo ball from a box containing 41 balls numbered from, and evenly spaced in, -0.2 to + 0.2 including zero. They recorded the random number (E). The subject's payoff for the round was just his or her output times $1.00 minus the cost of the decision number. Given the payoff function, the maximizing choice for a subject was 37. Thus by comparing the results of this experiment with those of experiment 1 or 3, we can test hypotheses 5 (the piece rate equivalence hypothesis) and 6 (the variance hypothesis). Moreover, because of its simplicity this experiment gave us a check on the ability of subjects to comprehend the procedures we were asking them to follow.
The next section reports the results of these experiments.
IV. Experimental Results
The broad outlines of the results of the experiments are given in table 2 and figures 1-1 1. The piece rate experiment serves as a point of comparison for many of the tournament experiments and so merits our attention first. As can be seen from figure 1 and table 2 , the piece rate system tested did very well. The theoretical mean effort level was 37 (just as in our baseline tournament), and the mean effort level in the twelfth round was 37.38. This mean is not significantly different from 37 at the 95 percent confidence level using a median test. The variance across subjects was 33.66. This variance is remarkably small when compared with the tournament variances. As the histogram in figure  12 shows, only three subjects differed substantially from the optimum (two chose 29 and one chose 51). In addition, the mean effort level never deviated from 37 by more than three during the entire 12 rounds. From the point of view of our experimental design, these results are encouraging because they show that the subjects understood our instructions, were motivated by the incentives to carry out calculations, and were capable of solving reasonably sophisticated problems. Furthermore, if one accepts that the subjects did understand the instructions and did carry out some kind of maximization, then the fact that the theoretical predictions, which relied on risk neutrality, were empirically confirmed suggests that our subjects, with perhaps three exceptions, were approximately risk neutral over the range of payoffs they were presented with. In summary, our laboratory piece rate system performed exceedingly well and provided strong evidence that our subjects were capable of making the calculations necessary to maximize their expected returns.
The experimental tournaments constitute the closest game-form analogue to the piece rate system just described. Despite this fact, our results offer weaker support for the theory of tournaments than was found for the theory of piece rates. We believe this is partly because games, even simple ones, are behaviorally more complex than maximization problems. The data demonstrate this. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 provide three independent tests of hypotheses IA and IB, that is, whether the predictions of the theory of tournaments hold in each tournament or on average across tournaments. Both table 2 and figures 2, 3, and 4 show that the average decision by the subjects tended to converge to the neighborhood of the effort level predicted by the theory and converged exactly in experiment 1. In that experiment the theory predicted a choice of 37, and the average choice in the last round was 36.94. Moreover, convergence to this final number was practically monotonic. The theoretical prediction for experiment 2 was 74, and by the last round the average choice was 67.61 (the average over the last four rounds was 70.5). In both cases a median test failed to reject equality between the theoretically predicted and observed medians at a 95 percent confidence level.'4 Thus there was a tendency for mean effort levels to converge 14 All statistical tests of hypotheses about means were tested using a nonparametric test on medians. As the theory predicts a zero variance in choices, the theoretically predicted median is equal to the mean. A 95 percent confidence interval was used throughout. It is important to note that the power of these tests is quite low. toward their theoretically expected levels in even tournaments. Although the large variance in behavior in the last round prevents us from saying anything very precise about whether choices are converging to the theoretically predicted level or some other level in its neighborhood, there does appear to be systematic behavior at work. In broad terms, mean effort levels in even tournaments usually started around 50 in period 1 and, if the theoretical equilibrium was below 50, then drifted down more or less monotonically and drifted up if the theoretical equilibrium was above 50.
These three experiments do not, then, reject hypothesis lB. Hypothesis IA, however, fares less well. While both hypotheses state that the mean effort level in the twelfth round will equal the theoretical value, hypothesis 1A requires that the variance across identical tournaments around this value be zero. In fact the variances of the choices in the last round of experiments 1, 2, and 3 were, respectively, 577.28, 1,005.37, and 349.33. These are considerably larger than the zero variance predicted by the theory and are also far higher than the variance of 33.66 found in the piece rate. These high variances were not due to outlying pairs either. Table 3 gives the twelfth-period variances with the two most extreme observations removed. Notice that experiments 1, 2, and 3 still had much higher variances than the piece rate, experiment 10. Moreover, we can see from table 2 that there was no apparent tendency for the variances in experiments 1, 2, and 3 to decline as the experiments progressed. Thus hypothesis 1A is not supported by our data; that is, the predictions of the theory do not hold for each individual tournament. Experiment 3, the wide random variable experiment, was used to test the invariance hypothesis (hypothesis 2). This hypothesis predicts that a mean-preserving spread of the uniform distribution of the random variable, offset by a reduction in the cost of effort in a manner consistent with equation (5), will leave unaltered the average choice across agents in the last period. This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the twelfth-period means of experiments 1 and 3. Using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, we find that these means were not significantly different at the 95 percent level of significance, and so hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected.
Comparing the results of experiments 1 and 10 enables us to test hypotheses 5 and 6, the piece rate equivalence and variance hypotheses. At the 95 percent level, using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, we could not reject the hypothesis that the mean twelfth-round effort levels were the same in the piece rate and the narrow random variable tournaments. The data also support the variance hypothesis; the variance of effort levels in the piece rate is only one-tenth of that for the tournament in experiment 1 and is less than one-third of the lowest variance observed in any of the experimental tournaments. Hypothesis 3, the disadvantaged contestant hypothesis, was tested by comparing the results of experiment 4 with the theoretical predictions given by equations (6) and (7). The average choice of the highcost subjects in the last round was 56.45, which is much higher than the 35 predicted by the theory of tournaments, and a WilcoxonMann-Whitney test shows that this average choice is, at the 95 percent level, significantly higher than that of the contestants in experiment 1, in which the theory predicted a choice of 37 (see fig. 4 ). The theory predicted, however, that the low-cost subjects would choose approximately 70, and their average choice in the last round was 75.55. Thus we are faced with the outcome that on average the theory underpredicts greatly the choices of the disadvantaged subjects and slightly underpredicts that of the advantaged agents. Subjecting contestants to a disadvantage seems to elicit higher effort from them rather than discourage them or cause them to drop out (provide zero effort), as we had informally conjectured. The question of relevance is then, Why do disadvantaged contestants choose effort levels that are higher than that predicted by the theory? One possible explanation for this is that in a tournament the payoff is a function not just of the monetary reward and the cost of effort but also of winning and losing the game.'5 If, in contrast to the theory, contestants are not, for a given monetary payoff, indifferent to whether they win or lose, then if the low-cost contestants choose 70, the high-cost contestants will choose a number higher than the 35 predicted by the theory.'6 However, this explanation fails to explain the behavior of the low-cost contestants. While these contestants' average last-period choices were very close to those predicted by the theory, they were not best responses to the actual average last-period choices of the high-cost contestants. This best response was 86. Thus the low-cost contestants not only did not reveal a utility of winning but, if anything, revealed a disutility of winning. At this time we have no explanation for the behavior observed in this experiment. Indeed, the result is sufficiently odd to suggest that more experimental work on uneven tournaments is a high-priority task.'7 15 A lack of indifference to winning and losing probably exists in all experiments that involve a game. 16 If contestants are getting a positive utility from winning, this does not violate Smith's (1982) precept of saliency in experimental design. That precept requires in this context only that the contestants, when faced with two alternatives that are identical in all respects other than the pecuniary payoff, choose the alternative with the higher pecuniary payoff. 17 It was suggested by a referee that the relative similarity of the effort levels of the advantaged and disadvantaged subjects might be the result of an equity effect demonstrated by Hoffman and Spitzer (1983) . They found that when subjects were randomly placed in unequal or asymmetric positions, the favored players would not fully exploit their advantage seemingly because they did not feel they had earned it. To test this Experiment 5 investigated the impact of providing more information in the form of reporting the total numbers to the subjects at the end of each round. Hypothesis 4 predicts that this information will have no effect on behavior. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the equality of last-period means between experiments 1 and 5 did not reject the null at a 95 percent confidence level, and so hypothesis 4 is not rejected. We had thought that the provision of output information would leave average choices in the twelfth round unaltered but might have reduced the variance of choices in that period compared with that in experiment 1. This hope was not fulfilled. The last-period variances in experiments 1 and 5 were, respectively, 577.28 and 430.03, which are quite similar. Table 3 shows that the variances are similar even if the two most extreme observations are removed. Figure 6 does, however, point out that mean effort levels seem, at best, to converge more slowly in experiment 5 than in experiment 1. This result is curious since, when in experiment 6 even more information was given to the subjects, their mean effort levels were closer to 37. Because of its practical importance in tournament design, further research on the impact of changing information structures on tournament behavior is clearly called for.
The large variance in behavior, both in absolute terms and relative to that of the piece rate, exhibited in all our experiments demands explanation. Experiment 6, the high-information experiment, was designed to investigate our informational explanation, namely, that subjects were making erroneous inferences about the choices of their opponents. By giving the subjects full information about their opponents' prior choices, we can rule out errors in inferring these choices as an explanation of variance in behavior. Table 2 and figure 7 show that, in terms of mean effort levels in period 12, the subjects behaved much as in experiments 1 and 3. It is interesting to note, however, that convergence in this experiment was from below 37. This differed from the type of convergence seen in other symmetric tournaments with the same parameters (see figs. 2, 6, and 7). This is strange because in experiment 5, where there was an intermediate level of information, effort levels remained above their theoretical equilibrium level in every period. In fact, in every period except one, the effort levels were ranked, medium information greater than low informaproposition they allowed subjects to play a preliminary game, the winner of which won the "right" to be advantaged at the second stage. When subjects earned the right to be advantaged, they exploited their position fully. In order to pursue this idea we replicated Hoffman and Spitzer's preliminary game using their instructions. The winner of this game became the advantaged player in the tournament. We found that the outcomes of these tournaments did not differ significantly from those reported in the text. Hence, in this context, equity considerations appear to be unimportant. tion greater than high information. This consistency across periods raises the possibility that this may be a generic characteristic of tournaments.
Finally, the variance of effort levels in the last round, 636.77, is even higher than in experiments 1, 3, and 5 (which used the same parameter values) and is 20 times the variance observed in the piece rate. Thus experiment 6 rejects the errors-in-inference explanation of the variance in behavior across tournaments and strongly suggests that it is simply the strategic nature of tournaments that gives rise to this variance.
Our conjectural explanation for the variance was tested by having the subjects play automata and having this be common knowledge. In experiment 8, which used the parameter values of experiment 1, the subjects were told they were playing against an automaton that would choose 37 each time. They were therefore faced with an optimization problem whose solution was 37. Table 2 shows that in this case the mean choice in the twelfth round was 40.41 and the variance was 275.30. This variance is considerably above that of the piece rate despite the fact that both experiments involve pure optimization problems for the subjects. Since no conjectural problems exist here, this suggests that one reason for the higher variance of choices in tournaments as opposed to piece rates is that the computational aspects of the maximizations in the tournaments are harder than those in the piece rates, presumably because of the discontinuity in the payoff function. This is consistent with the third explanation offered for the variance across tournaments. However, the variance observed in experiment 8 is lower than those obtained in the tournaments, experiments 1-7 and 9. This supports the hypothesis that conjectural variations do account for a significant amount of the variance across tournaments. I Experiment 7 differed from 8 in that the subjects were told only that the automaton would choose the same decision number in each round but not what number would be chosen. Notice that this too faces the subjects with an optimization rather than a game, though a much more difficult optimization than in experiment 8 or 10. Thus in experiment 7 the subjects have something to learn, but they do not have to consider any conjectural variations (cf. experiment 6). In this experiment the average twelfth-period choice was 44.46 while the variance was 336.84. Thus removing information about the choice of the automaton did not raise the variance of the last-period choices. This reinforces the results of experiment 6, which suggested that it was conjectural variations that caused the variance of choices rather than a lack of information about past plays by the pair member. However, a look at the histograms for the twelfth-period choices in figure 15 gives the histogram for twelfth-period choices in experiment 1, which demonstrates considerably more dispersion than even experiment 7. We interpret this as showing the impact of being faced with a game rather than an optimization.
With a view to providing a practical way of reducing the variance in behavior, experiment 9 iterated the tournament of experiment 1 25 rather than 12 times. Table 2 shows that in fact the variance of behavior was not reduced significantly by increasing the number of repetitions. Given the results of experiment 6, this should not be surprising. While playing against an opponent for longer may enable one to make more accurate inferences about his strategy, we have already seen that this informational problem is not the cause of the high variance. Notice that figure 10 shows that the mean effort level in experiment 9 behaved somewhat differently compared with other experiments using the same parameters. In particular, it did not fall very rapidly at all.
Finally, notice that experiments 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9 all used parameter values that give a Nash equilibrium of 37. Indeed, all of them, except 3, used identical parameter values. The paths of the mean effort levels are collected in figure 11. This figure confirms the observations made on the basis of experiments 1, 2, and 3 alone that there is some systematic behavior at work. Also plotted on figure 11 is the result of the 74 tournament. If we contrast this plot with those of the 37 Nash experiments, the systematic behavior appears to be loosely predicted by the theory of tournaments.
V. Conclusions
The experimental results show that there is systematic behavior by agents when faced with a tournament. This is demonstrated most clearly in figure 11 and is also shown by the very different behavior of the high-and low-cost subjects in the uneven tournament. However, while on average there is systematic behavior, there is at the individual level a very large variance of behavior. As we have seen, this latter fact contrasts sharply with what is observed in a piece rate setting and, we conjecture, in other incentive systems that rely solely on simple maximization by the individual agent. Such variance of behavior in tournaments seems to be a result of their game nature rather than the information structure as usually assumed.
At a gross level the theory of tournaments seems to be able to predict at least some of the qualitative properties of systematic average behavior. Thus if we consider two even tournaments whose Nash equilibria are in some sense far apart, our experiments suggest that average behavior in those two tournaments will diverge in the way predicted by the theory. Similarly, in an uneven tournament in which the different types of subjects differ substantially, the theory predicts qualitatively the right differences in average behavior between the types, though here the theory's quantitative predictions seem to be in error. In this sense the theory did quite well in these experiments.
The inability of the theory to explain the diversity of individual behavior has significant practical and theoretical implications notably for the choice of incentive systems. In particular, incentive systems based purely on individual maximization seem to result in much less diversity of behavior than what occurs in tournaments. Because this difference between the two types of incentive systems does not show up in the theory of the two systems, it has not entered into the discussion of the environments in which tournaments are more efficient than piece rates. However, as a practical matter, it appears that a cost to choosing a tournament system over a piece rate system is that the principal must bear uncertainty as to how the agents will react to the tournament.
If the principal is risk neutral, as is usually assumed in the literature, he or she can bear the uncertainty concerning the outcome of the tournament at no cost. The agents, however, are usually treated as risk averse. Our results suggest that in deciding whether or not to join a tournament the agents will have to take into account two sources of uncertainty. One of these is a part of the existing theoretical literature, namely, the distribution of the prizes induced by the randomness in production. Note that this distribution is conditional on the use of Nash equilibrium strategies by all the agents in the tournament. The second source of uncertainty, which is not in the literature, is precisely the uncertainty concerning how the specific tournament that the agent enters will be played. The fact that an agent must bear this uncertainty will be reflected in a higher expected payment necessary to induce him or her to join the tournament. Thus even a riskneutral principal will have to take into account this additional source of uncertainty.
In our experiments the theory of tournaments did much better in symmetric tournaments than in uneven ones. In the relevant experiment the theory predicted well the average behavior of the low-cost Note, the amount subtracted in column 5 (decision cost) is only a function of your decision number; that is, your random number draw does not affect the amount subtracted. Additionally, your total earnings depend on your random draw, your selected decision number (both in its contribution to your total and the subtraction of its associated cost from your fixed payment, either X or Y), and your pair member's selected decision number and random draw.
